In this paper, an economy is analyzed where one group of agents, the altruists, cares about the well-being of another group of agents, the recipients. It is asked how changes in the size of these groups affect the altruists' charitable giving in the Nash equilibrium. I show that a pure group size effect, i.e. a proportional expansion of both subgroups can lead to less free riding and to a lower degree of underprovision relative to the efficient level of charitable giving.
Introduction
In this paper, an economy is analyzed where one group of agents, the altruists, cares about the well-being of another group of agents, the recipients. It is asked how changes in the size of these groups affect the altruists' charitable giving in the Nash equilibrium. Particular attention is given to the question whether replications of the whole economy increase or decrease (i) per-capita donations, (ii) the ratio between contributors and free riders, and (iii) the ratio between the equilibrium level and the efficient level of charitable giving. This question is motivated by a closely related topic of the literature, namely the effect of an increase in group size on private donations to a public good. In this context, it has been shown by means of the voluntary contribution model of public good provision that the variables (i), (ii), and (iii) are negatively correlated with group size (see McGuire, 1974; Chamberlin, 1974; Andreoni, 1988; Fries et al., 1991; Gaube, 2001) . These findings on public good provision thus confirm Olson's (1965) claim that the free rider problem of voluntary donations becomes more severe as group size increases. The voluntary contribution model of public good provision has been interpreted in two different ways. First, in the literal sense, namely that a nonrival commodity like public broadcasting is provided. In terms of this interpretation, the model relies on the implicit assumption that the individuals contribute to the public good only because of their personal interest in consuming this commodity. Hence, altruistic motives play no role. Still, following Becker (1974) , the same model is employed also for investigating altruistically motivated donations. The proposed analogy between altruistic giving and (selfish) public good provision is based on the idea that an altruist's donation to another individual is equivalent to a public good because the other altruists become better off as well. Therefore, the public good model has been used for analyzing any form of private donations which can broadly be classified as a contribution to 'good causes'. From this perspective, the group-size results of the literature thus suggest that public intervention into the market equilibrium for charitable giving becomes more desirable as group size is increased.
The present paper argues that the comparison between voluntary donations in a small and a large community may be different for the case of altruistically motivated giving (i.e. charitable giving in the literal sense) than for the case of selfish donations to a public good. The reasoning is as follows: Consider a community where a local radio station is financed by voluntary donations. If group size in this community is increased by introducing replicas of each agent, the agents' utility from consuming the public good does not change and all contributors reduce their donations in the Nash equilibrium because they correctly anticipate that their replicas will contribute to the public good as well. In contrast, assume now that a group of altruists supports a group of individuals who are in need of an expensive medical treatment. Since charitable giving is nonrival from the altruists' perspective, the two examples are formally equivalent as long as a change in group size is modelled by replicating only the group of altruists. However, if the whole economy is replicated charitable giving has to be allocated among a larger number of individuals because the monetary transfers are perfectly rival from the recipients' perspective. Hence, as long as the altruists care about single individuals and not just about the aggregate donation, they will take the increased number of recipients into account. Therefore, an increase in group size may affect charitable giving in a different way than suggested from a model where the aggregate donation is nonrival for all agents in the economy.
The subsequent analysis aims to explore the consequences of this argument in more detail. For that purpose, altruistic preferences are not expressed indirectly by introducing a public good but directly by assuming that an altruist's utility depends on the well-being of each recipient. This framework allows to investigate how changes in the number of altruists and recipients affect charitable giving in the Nash equilibrium. It is shown that the altruists' per-capita donation and the ratio between contributors and non-contributors can be increasing in group size provided that replications of the whole economy are considered. For the case of additively separable altruistic preferences, a neutrality result is established according to which the equilibrium allocation in per-capita terms does not change if the number of altruists and recipients is increased proportionally. Similar findings are obtained with respect to the ratio between the equilibrium level and the efficient level of charitable giving: It is shown that this ratio can also be increasing in group size and may even converge to unity if the economy becomes sufficiently large.
These findings point out that altruistic charitable giving can react quite differently to a change in group size than selfish donations to a public good. Note, however, that an agent's selfish interest in consuming a public good does not preclude a simultaneous altruistic motive of providing the public good for the other agents in the economy (see e.g. Andreoni and Miller, 2002) . From this perspective, the present investigation is in line with some recent studies (see Anderson et al., 1998 and Goeree et al., 2002) who show that such an altruistic motive may explain why a non-positive correlation between group size and free riding has been observed in several public good experiments.
1 Still, in concentrating on the explanation of laboratory behavior in linear public good games, these analyses differ from the present one in various ways. First, the subsequent analysis considers only an altruistic link between the donors and the recipients, but not among the donors themselves. Therefore, the findings do not rely on the idea that the social return of a nonrival commodity increases with group size, but on the observation that charitable donations are nonrival only from the altruists' perspective. Second, the present study investigates a nonlinear model where public and private consumption are imperfect substitutes and where no specific form of altruistic preferences is assumed from the outset. Accordingly, interior Nash equilibria and interior efficient allocations are analyzed, and it is shown that the functional form of altruistic preferences is crucial for answering the question whether group size and free riding are positively correlated.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Section 3, the link between group size, per-capita donations, and free riding incentives is analyzed. Section 4 deals with the effect of group size on the ratio between the equilibrium level and the efficient level of charitable giving. Section 5 concludes.
The model
Consider an economy which consists of two groups of agents, namely I ≥ 1 altruists and K ≥ 1 recipients. The recipients k = 1, ..., K have no initial wealth and rely on monetary transfers b k which are financed by the altruists. It is assumed that the well-being of each recipient is monotonically increasing in b k . An altruist of type i ∈ {1, ..., I} has monetary endowment ω i > 0 which can be spend for private consumption x i and charitable giving g i . The sum G of these donations is allocated among the recipients such that G = K k=1 b k . It is assumed that the altruists' preferences can be represented by quasiconcave utility functions
which are increasing in x i , weakly increasing in g i , and increasing in b k , k = 1, ..., K at least for transfers below some thresholdb. This means that all types i care about the well-being of all recipients k. Hence, each transfer b k is a public good from the altruists' perspective. In addition, the variable g i takes into account that charitable experiments where group size and free riding are negatively correlated. The empirical findings of Lipford (1996) , Brunner (1998) , and Haan and Kooreman (2002) which deal with contributions to churches, broadcasting, and candy bars respectively, also raise doubts that the free-rider problem of voluntary public good provision becomes more severe as more agents enter the economy.
giving may also provide private utility in the sense of Andreoni's (1990) warm-glow model of impure altruism.
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In terms of the utility functions (1), a change in the number of recipients K can be interpreted as a change in the number of public goods. In order to obtain a framework which is as close as possible to the standard model of a single privately supplied public good, I will assume that the derivativesã
satisfy the conditions
This assumption means that the altruists are either indifferent with respect to the distribution of the aggregate transfer G = 
In the following, a change in group size is analyzed by considering replications of an initial economy which consists of the I ≥ 1 altruists and where the number of recipients K is normalized to unity. The subgroup of altruists and the subgroup of recipients is increased by introducing N −1 ≥ 0 replicas of each altruist i ∈ {1, ..., I} and K−1 ≥ 0 replicas of the single recipient respectively. Aggregate charitable giving in an economy with N I altruists thus amounts to G = N ( I i=1 g i ). I will distinguish between partial replications of the economy where either N or K is changed and full replications of the economy where N and K are increased proportionally such that the initial ratio N I/K = I between altruists and recipients remains unaffected.
When deciding upon x i and g i , an altruist takes the aggregate provision G −i := G − g i of all other altruists as given.
3 Since g i and x i have to satisfy the budget 
Accordingly, we obtain m i (ω i , 0, G, K) ≤ 1 for the free riders.
4 Like in the literature on voluntary public good provision, the subsequent analysis relies on the assumption that x i and G are normal goods and that the 'demand' for a warm glow is at least non-inferior. This can be expressed by means of the assumption that the marginal rates of substitution m i (·) > 0 are increasing in x i , decreasing in G, and weakly increasing in g i . Hence,
The normality assumption (5) implies that a unique Nash equilibrium (g 
Note that a change of the parameters N, K can influence the individuals' contributions g 
With this formulation, the same results can be derived, but the presentation of Samuelson's rule (7) becomes more complicated.
5 See Andreoni (1990) where normality is defined in terms of the donors' demand functions for public and private consumption. This definition is equivalent to the inequalities in (5).
contributors or m i (x i , g i , G, K) ≤ 1 for the non-contributors are affected. Hence, if these inequalities are strict for all types i, i.e. if no altruist chooses an interior dona-
may not react to small changes of N and K for trivial reasons. In order to avoid multiple repetitions of this technical qualification I will assume
from the outset. This assumption implies that m i (x i , g i , G, K) = 1 holds for at least one type i ∈ C v (N, K), but it does not require that a specific type i ∈ {1, ..., I} is a contributor irrespective of N and K.
In terms of positive analysis, the link between group size and free riding is usually discussed by means of the variables g v (·) and c v (·). From a normative perspective, however, the comparison between the equilibrium provision G v (N, K) and efficient charitable giving G * (N, K) is of interest as well. Therefore, an efficiency benchmark has to be determined. In the following, efficient allocations will be characterized by means of the Samuelson condition
Two comments with respect to this condition are in order. First, note that each allocation which satisfies (7) may correspond to a different provision level G * (·).
Therefore, one of these allocations has to be chosen. Following the analysis in Gaube (2001) , I will employ the Lindahl allocation as a reference point for efficient charitable giving. In the present context, the Lindahl equilibrium is defined as follows:
The agents of type i = 1, ..., I maximize utility
where p i is the personalized price of the public good. In addition, they take into account that their personal contribution to the public good equals g i = p i G. In this way, the demand functions
is the Lindahl price for the agents of type i ∈ {1, ..., I}.
It should be noted also that the Samuelson condition (7) takes only the utility of the altruists, but not of the recipients into account. Clearly, a Pareto improvement among the recipients can be obtained if and only if the aggregate transfer G = K k=1 b k is increased. Hence, if we consider an allocation where the inequality N I i=1 m i (x i , g i , G, K) > 1 holds, an increase in G can be used to make all types i = 1, ..., I and all agents k = 1, ..., K better off. However, allocations with N I i=1 m i (x i , g i , G, K) < 1 can also be Pareto efficient from the perspective of the whole economy because a reduction in G necessarily harms at least one of the recipients k ∈ {1, ..., K}. In the present context, the quantity G * (N, K) should thus be interpreted as the minimal amount of Pareto efficient charitable giving.
Free riding and easy riding
This section is devoted to the question how changes in group size affect the proportion of contributors c v (N, K) and the per-capita contribution g v (N, K) in the Nash equilibrium. For the voluntary contribution model of public good provision where it is assumed that the preferences of all agents can be expressed by means of utility functions U i (x i , G), this topic has been analyzed for example in Fries et al. (1991) .
They show that the proportion of contributing agents and the per-capita contribution are weakly decreasing in group size. 6 Hence, free-riding tendencies in the literal sense and in the figurative sense (i.e. easy riding in the terminology of Cornes and Sandler, 1996) are exacerbated if more agents enter the economy. In the following, I will show that these findings do not hold in the present model if replications of the whole economy are considered and if the altruists do not only care about aggregate giving but about the well-being of single individuals.
The altruists' utility functions (3) differ from the utility functions U i (x i , G) of the public good model in two ways. First, a private motive g i of charitable giving is taken into account. Second, the additional group size parameter K is introduced. Note that the warm-glow effect g i does only ameliorate but not abolish the altruists' incentive for free riding if new replicas enter the economy. This means that the results of the literature should hold in the present model as well as long as only a partial replication of the economy, namely of the subgroup of altruists is considered.
The following preliminary finding shows that this is indeed the case. The proofs of all propositions are relegated to the Appendix.
Proposition 1: The per-capita contribution g v (N, K) is decreasing and the propor-
Proposition 1 extends the analysis of Fries et al. (1991) by pointing out that g v (N, K) and c v (N, K) are (weakly) decreasing in the number of potential donors 6 Similar findings can be found in McGuire (1974) , Chamberlin (1974) , and Andreoni (1988) .
The paper by Fries et al. (1991) is closest to the present analysis because it also models a change in group size by replicating an initial economy with heterogeneous individuals.
N I also if some private, non-altruistic motive U i (·, g i , ·) of charitable giving is taken into account. Clearly, this result holds for a proportional increase in N and K as well provided that the functions U i (x i , g i , G, K) do not depend on K. In this case, the altruists care only about the aggregate transfer G such that the number of potential recipients K becomes irrelevant for the amount of charitable giving. In terms of the altruistic preferences (1), this assumption corresponds to the special casẽ
In fact, with preferences of the form (8), the utility functions
Therefore, a change in K has no effect on charitable giving Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 point out that the group size results of the literature on public good provision can be interpreted in terms of the present model in two different ways. First, as a thought experiment where only the number of altruists is changed such that an increase in group size simultaneously leads to a higher ratio between the number of altruists and recipients. Second, as an implicit assumption concerning altruistic preferences, namely the hypothesis that the donors take only the aggregate transfer G = K k=1 b k into account and do not care about the number K of individuals among which these donations have to be allocated.
In the following, an increase in group size is identified with replications of the whole economy. Therefore, I will concentrate on the question whether the findings of Corollary 1 may change if other preferences than in the example (8) are considered.
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Note first that a different result than in Corollary 1 can only be obtained if an isolated increase in K increases the per-capita contribution g v (N, K) in the Nash equilibrium. Due to the first-order conditions (4), this property holds if the marginal rates of substitution m i (x i , g i , G, K) between public and private consumption are increasing in K for all types i. However, since a replication of the whole economy 7 In the example (8), we haveã
Hence, the functions U i (·) do not depend on the number of recipients K. 8 Abrams and Schmitz (1984) provide evidence that the number of potential recipients has a positive effect on charitable giving. This result suggests that other preferences than in (8) are relevant from an empirical point of view.
increases the per-capita contribution g v (N, K) only if the positive effect of K overcompensates the negative effect of N , a stronger assumption has to be made. The following result shows that a proportional increase in the number of altruists and recipients weakly increases g v (N, K) as long as the marginal rates of substitution
between private consumption and the per-capita transfer b are weakly increasing in K. Note that the definition ofm i (·) makes use of the relationship bK = G. Hence, 
For the intuition behind this finding, consider the case where the functionŝ m i (x i , g i , b, K) are increasing in K. Assume now that K and N are increased to K + 1 and N + 1 respectively, and that the additional altruist of each type i imitates the existing altruists by choosing the same initial contribution g v i (N, K). This implies that the aggregate donation G is increasing whereas x i , g i , and b remain constant for all individuals. However, in this situation the contributing types have an incentive to increase their initial contribution g v i (N, K) > 0 because the change in K has increased their marginal rates of substitutionm i (x i , g i , b, K) ≥ 1 between the per-capita transfer b and private consumption (x i , g i ). Therefore, a full replication of the economy leads to a higher per-capita contribution g v (N, K).
Proposition 2 relies on three distinct assumptions concerning the effect of the number of recipients K on the marginal rates of substitutionm i (x i , g i , b, K). This raises the question under which assumptions concerning the altruistic preferences (1) these three cases are obtained. For a clarification of this point, consider the benchmark case of group-size neutrality where a full replication of the initial economy has no effect on the per-capita allocation (x i , g i , b). According to Proposition 2, this property holds if the functionsm i (x i , g i , b, K) are independent of K. This assumption means that the donors' incentive to transfer money to the recipients does not change with an increase in K as long as all recipients obtain the same transfer b as before. The latter property corresponds to preferences for which an additively separable utility representatioñ
exists. In fact, with preferences of the form (9), we get
9 It can easily be verified that these utility functions im-
. Because of Proposition 2, we thus obtain
Corollary 2: Consider altruistic preferences of the form (9). Then g v (N, N ) and
For the intuition behind Corollary 2 consider the initial economy where I altruists care about a single recipient k = 1. With preferences of the form (9), the altruists' marginal rates of substitutionŨ
) between the transfer b 1 and private consumption do not change if a second recipient k = 2 enters the economy. Hence, their donations remain constant provided that the new altruists behave equivalently by financing the same donation b 2 = b 1 for the recipient k = 2. In contrast to the example (8), where the altruists care only about the aggregate transfer G, the donations of the new donors thus do not crowd out those of the initial altruists. Therefore, the positive effect of K on the per-capita contribution g v (N, K) exactly cancels out the negative effect of an increase in N .
The Corollaries 1 and 2 refer to altruistic preferences (1) where the functionŝ m i (x i , g i , b, K) are decreasing in K or independent of K respectively. In the following, I will show that the marginal rates of substitutionm i (x i , g i , b, K) can be increasing in K as well. For an illustration, consider the example discussed in the introductory section: Assume that the number T ≥ 0 of those agents who cannot afford the cost z of a medical treatment generates a negative externality upon the altruists. In the absence of charitable giving, T equals the number of recipients K. Private donations G ≤ Kz reduce this number to T = K − G/z which can equivalently be expressed by means of T = K k=1 (1 − b k /z). In terms of the altruistic preferences (1), we thus obtainã
are decreasing inã K (·). With preferences of type (10), the marginal rates of sub-
Due to Proposition 2, the per-capita contribution g v (N, N ) is thus increasing in N . Moreover, the special case (10) also implies that the proportion of contributors c v (N, N ) is non-decreasing in N . These findings are established in the Appendix and can be summarized by means of 9 In the example (9), we haveã
Note that the assumption (5) can be satisfied only if the functions f i (·) are strictly concave. Therefore, the example (9) rules out preferences of the form (8). For the intuition behind Corollary 3, consider again a situation where K, N , and G are increased proportionally such that the average transfer b does not change. This implies that the percentage T /K = 1 − b/z of those individuals who remain without treatment is kept constant. Hence, the absolute amount T of these agents is increased. Since the negative externality depends on T , the altruists thus have an incentive to further increase their donation. Therefore, the per-capita contribution and the proportion of contributors among the altruists are (weakly) increasing if the whole economy is replicated.
The index of easy riding
The three examples which have been discussed in Section 3 illustrate different assumptions concerning the effect of a change in the number of recipients K on the altruists' preferences for private consumption and charitable giving. Clearly, this effect is relevant also for the relationship between group size and the efficient level of charitable giving. Therefore, the results of Section 3 do not clarify whether the deficiencies of the Nash equilibrium relative to an efficient allocation become more or less severe as group size is increased. In the following, this issue will be discussed.
In the present context, inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium means that all altruists and all recipients can be made better off if charitable giving is increased above the equilibrium level G v (N, K). This property corresponds to the observation that the efficient provision level G * (N, K) in the Lindahl equilibrium exceeds G v (N, K) for economies with at least two altruists. 10 We thus have
provided that N I ≥ 2. This property is equivalent to g v (·)/g * (·) < 1 where
is the altruists' per-capita donation in the Lindahl equilibrium. In the theoretical and experimental literature on the link between group size and public good provision, the ratio
is usually employed as a measure of underprovision. Following the terminology of Cornes and Sandler (1996) , I will refer to this ratio as the index of easy riding. The 10 As shown in Buchholz and Peters (2001) subsequent analysis investigates how full replications of the initial economy affect e(N, K) for the case of altruistic charitable giving.
In the voluntary contribution model of public good provision where utility functions U i (x i , G) are assumed, group size and free riding tendencies are positively correlated (see Proposition 1). Hence, intuition suggests that the index of easy riding should decrease in this model as the economy becomes larger. However, neither a general proof of this claim nor a counterexample is available. Therefore, the literature has concentrated on examples where U i (x i , G) is either quasilinear or Cobb-Douglas (see Sandler 1992 , Chapter 7 for a critical discussion). The Cobb-Douglas example has been generalized in Gaube (2001) by showing that the index of easy riding is decreasing in group size provided that the commodities x i and G are strictly normal and weak gross substitutes. Since the assumption of strict normality is crucial for uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and has been employed also in Section 3, I will use this finding as a reference point for the subsequent analysis.
Before investigating the ratio g v (·)/g * (·), consider first the effect of an isolated increase in N and a proportional increase in N and K on the efficient per-capita donation g * (N, K): The commodities x i and G are weak gross substitutes for an agent of type i as long as the demand function x i (p i , ω i , K) in the Lindahl economy is weakly increasing in the personalized price p i of the public good. In analogy to Lemma 2 of Gaube (2001) , part (a) of the following Proposition 3 points out that this assumption is sufficient for obtaining a positive relationship between the per-capita contribution g * (N, K) in the Lindahl equilibrium and the group size parameter N .
In contrast, part (b) of Proposition 3 refers to a proportional increase in N and K. Similar to Proposition 2, it is shown that g * (N, N ) is increasing in N as long as an additional recipient has a non-negative effect on the marginal rates of substitution
Proposition 3: (a) If public and private consumption are weak gross substitutes for all types i ∈ {1, ..., I}, g
Consider first part (a) of Proposition 3. The intuition behind this finding is as follows: Since an increase in the number of altruists decreases the Lindahl prices p * i (N, K), the individuals' contributions p i G = ω i − x i are weakly increasing in N as long as the functions x i (p i , ω i , K) are weakly increasing in p i . Because of Proposition 1, the gross-substitutes assumption thus implies that the index of easy riding e(N, K) is decreasing in N . Clearly, this finding holds also for a proportional increase in N and K provided that an isolated change of K does not affect g * (N, K) and g v (N, K)
respectively. The latter property holds if the utility functions U i (x i , g i , G, K) are independent of K, i.e. if preferences can be described by means of the example (8).
In this case, Corollary 1 and Proposition 3 thus imply Corollary 4: Consider altruistic preferences of the form (8) and assume that public and private consumption are weak gross substitutes for all types i = 1, ..., I. Then the index of easy riding e(N, N ) is decreasing in N .
With altruistic preferences of type (8), the present model is equivalent to the public good model U i (x i , G) because a replication of the group of altruists has the same effect on charitable giving as a replication of the whole economy. In analogy to Corollary 1, Corollary 4 thus serves as a reference point for investigating the potential differences between non-altruistic public good provision and an altruistic motive for charitable giving. For that purpose, I will compare Corollary 4 with the examples (9) and (10) of Section 3 where, in contrast to the example (8), an increase in the number of recipients K has a positive effect on the equilibrium provision level g v (N, K) and the efficient provision level g * (N, K). The per-capita donations g v (N, K) and g * (N, K) are increasing in K for the preferences (9), but are independent of K for the preferences (8). The comparison between these examples thus shows that a positive effect of K on charitable giving g v (N, K) does not imply a lower degree of underprovision relative to the efficient level g * (N, K) because the latter is increasing in K as well. In fact, since Corollary 5 holds also if the gross-substitutes assumption is violated, the example (9) makes a stronger point for the claim that the efficiency measure e(N, N ) is decreasing in group size than the example (8). Still, the subsequent analysis points out that group size and the index of easy riding can also be positively correlated in the present context. This will be illustrated by means of the example (10).
In the examples (8) and (9) Proposition 4: Assume that the functionsm i (x i , g i , b, K) are increasing in K for all types i ∈ {1, ..., I} and that
Then e(N, N ) is increasing in N at least for some N ≥ 1 and converges to unity as N converges to infinity.
For the intuition behind Proposition 4, assume a single type of altruists, i.e. I = 1. This implies that all altruists are identical and that their Lindahl prices equal 1/N . Hence, an allocation (x i ,ḡ i ,b) is the Lindahl equilibrium of an economy with parametersN =K ≥ 2 provided thatm i (x i ,ḡ i ,b,K) = 1/N . Because of the first-order conditions (4), the same vector (x i ,ḡ i ,b) is also a Nash equilibrium in an economy with parametersÑ =K as long asm i (x i ,ḡ i ,b,K) = 1. The assumption lim K→∞mi (x i ,ḡ i ,b, K) > 1 of Proposition 4 thus implies that any allocation (x i ,ḡ i ,b) which is efficient in theN −K-economy can be implemented as a Nash equilibrium if the corresponding group sizeK =Ñ becomes sufficiently large. Therefore, g v (N, N ) and g * (N, N ) must converge to the same upper boundḡ ≤ω as group size N converges to infinity. Accordingly, the ratio g v (N, N )/g * (N, N ) converges to unity which means that it cannot decrease in group size for any N ≥ 1.
For an example of preferences which are in line with the assumptions of Proposition 4, consider a special case of the utility functions (10), namelỹ
Because of 
Corollary 6: Consider altruistic preferences of the form (11). Then e(N, N ) is increasing in N at least for some N ≥ 1 and converges to unity as N converges to infinity.
Proposition 4 and Corollary 6 are in stark contrast to the widespread claim that the free-rider problem of voluntary charitable giving becomes more severe as group size is increased. Note, however, that the findings rely on a thought experiment where it is assumed that the economy's size N = K grows to infinity. This raises the question whether a positive relationship between group size and the index of easy riding e(N, N ) can be established also for a small group of agents. In order to show that this is indeed the case, consider the following example with a single type of donors, i.e. I = 1. This assumption means that we have only one altruist in the initial economy of size N = K = 1. Since no positive externality among the altruists can be generated in this case, an efficient allocation is obtained such that e(1, 1) = 1. With at least two altruists, however, voluntary contributions are inefficiently low (see fn. 10). Therefore, the inequality e(2, 2) < e(1, 1) holds generally with a single type of donors. Assume now that the altruists' preferences can be described by a utility function of the form (11) and consider the example u i (x i , g i ) = ln x i + δ ln g i where δ ≥ 0. A numerical analysis of this example shows that the graph of the function e(N, N ) is U-shaped, i.e. that e(N, N ) is decreasing in N for all N below some thresholdN ≥ 2 and increasing in N for all N ≥N . Depending on the parameters α, δ, z and the donors' endowment ω i , any threshold valueN ≥ 2 can be generated. Hence, the index of easy riding e(N, N ) can be increasing in N even if small groups with N ≥ 3 altruists (and recipients) are considered.
Conclusion
The present paper relies on the presumption that the comparison between charitable giving in a small and a large community should take into account that the same group structure is investigated in both cases only if the number of potential donors and the number of potential recipients is changed proportionally. Therefore, a model is introduced where altruistic motives are expressed in terms of utility interdependence such that the effect of an increase in the size of each subgroup can be analyzed. It is shown that this model is equivalent to the voluntary contribution model of public good provision provided that a specific structure of altruistic preferences is assumed.
Hence,m i (x i , g i , b, K) is increasing in K and exceeds unity for any vector (x i ,ḡ i ,b) as defined in Proposition 4 provided that K becomes sufficiently large.
In this case, the main results of the literature are confirmed, namely that an increase in group size leads to a decrease in (i) per-capita contributions, (ii) the ratio between contributors and free riders, and (iii) the ratio between the equilibrium level and the efficient level of public good provision. However, if the altruists care not just about the aggregate donation, but also about the number of potential recipients, each of these variables can be positively correlated with group size. Hence, the free rider problem of voluntary charitable giving may not become worse as group size is increased because monetary transfers are equivalent to a public good only from the altruists', but not from the recipients' perspective.
The model presented in Section 2 provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the link between group size and charitable giving which does not presume a specific functional form of altruistic preferences from the outset. In this way, it is pointed out by means of the examples (8) - (11) that the form of altruistic preferences is crucial for answering the question whether an increase in group size alleviates or exacerbates the free-rider problem of charitable giving. However, the analysis does not clarify which type of preferences is most relevant from an empirical point of view. To my knowledge, neither empirical nor experimental results are available which refer to the effect of group size on purely altruistic donations, i.e. voluntary contributions where, like in the dictator game, the donors' private interest in consuming the aggregate donation is ruled out by assumption.
12 Therefore, further research is required in order to shed light on the question whether real-world altruistic preferences imply that private charitable giving becomes more (less) efficient as group size is increased.
ḡ i ≤g i for all types i ∈ C v (Ñ ,Ñ ) where the strict inequality holds provided that 0 <g i < ω i . Due to the assumption (6), we thus haveḡ <g which contradicts the initial claimḡ ≥g. Therefore, g v (N, K) is decreasing in N .
The resultḡ <g impliesḡ j <g j for at least some type j ∈ {1, ..., I}. Because of the first-order conditions (4), this can old only if m j (x j ,g j ,Ḡ, K) < m j (x j ,g j ,G, K). Since m j (·) is decreasing in G, we thus haveḠ >G. Using the first-order conditions (4) for the types i = j as well, the propertyḠ >G leads toḡ i ≤g i for all i = j. Therefore, c v (N, K) is weakly decreasing in N . Consider now the Nash equilibrium in two economies with parametersÑ =K andN =K =Ñ + 1 respectively and employ the same notation as in the proof of Proposition 2. Because ofḡ >g, we must haveḡ j >g j for at least one type j ∈ {1, ..., I}. Due to the agents' first-order conditions (4) this can hold only ifm j (x j ,g j ,b,K) >m j (x j ,g j ,b,K). In the present example, this leads tõ m j (x j ,g j ,ā) >m j (x j ,g j ,ã) whereā := aK(b) andã := aK(b). Since the property ∂m i (·)/∂b < 0 implies thatm i (·) is decreasing in a K (b), we thus haveā <ã.
Accordingly,m i (x i ,g i ,b,K) >m i (x i ,g i ,b,K) holds for all types i ∈ {1, ..., I}. Using again the first-order conditions (4), this impliesḡ i ≥g i for all i. Therefore,
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider first the individuals' first-order conditions m i (x i , g i , G, K) = p i in the Lindahl equilibrium where g i = p i G and x i = ω i − g i . Because of ∂m i (·)/∂x i > 0, ∂m i (·)/∂G < 0, and ∂m i (·)/∂g i ≤ 0, these conditions imply that the demand functions G i (p i , ω i , K) are strictly decreasing in p i . For the same reason, G i (p i , ω i , K) is increasing in K provided that m i (x i , g i , G, K) is increasing in K.
(a) Let define x fore, the functions G i (p i , ω i , K) are increasing in K and decreasing in p i for all types i (see above). Note also that the equilibrium condition N
